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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, • 
• 
-v-
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
• 
• Case No. 18082 
ROBERT REEDY, JR., • 
• 
Defendant-Appellant • • 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Robert Reedy, Jr., appeals from a 
conviction folowing a jury trial of the crime of Aggravated 
Robbery, a felony of the First Degree • 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with and convicted of 
Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the First Degree, in violation 
of Title 76, Chapter 6, § 302 ·of Utah Code Ann. (1978). 
Subsequently, the trial judge entered a judgment of conviction 
for the next lower category of offense, pursuant to the motion 
• 
of appellant's counsel, and sentenced the appellant to serve 
an undeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the Utah 
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State Prison as provided by law for a felony of the Second 
Degree.I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have the conviction and 
sentence rendered below affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 28, 1980, Mr. John Palmer, an attendant at a 
service station located at 200 West, 1300 South, Salt Lake 
City, was robbed by two men. The robbery occurred during 
daylight hours, between 8:15 to 8:30 a.m. of that morning 
(T. 10). The two perpetrators first approached Mr. Palmer and 
asked for change so that they might use a Coke machine on the 
premises (T. 10). After using the machine, one of the 
perpetrators approached Palmer again and displayed a revolver 
(T. 10). This perpetrator, whom Palmer later described as 
having dark hair and a small moustache, demanded that Palmer 
give him all the station's money (T. 11). Palmer indicated he 
I 
was face-to-face with this man, whom he later identified on a 
police photograph, for a period of "probably five to six 
minutes" (T. 15). Palmer picked this photograph out of six 
different photos shown to him twelve days after the crime 
(T. 15,16). When asked whether he was certain that the man 
l Respondent has confirmed that the Third District Court 
file contains a Judgment and Commitment which reflects the 
proper sentence. 
-2-
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in the photograph was the perpetrator, Palmer replied that he 
was "one-hundred per cent sure" (T. 17). 
Palmer was able to give a detailed description of 
the weapon used in the holdup, indicating that it was black, 
about eight inches long, and probably a .22 caliber pistol (T. 
11,12). Also, while the robbery was going on, Palmer was able 
to remember that the second individual, who appeared with the 
gunman originally to get change, was over on the other side of 
the gas station looking through a glass sliding door (T. 13). 
Finally, Palmer clearly recalled that both men ran 
to the other side of the gas station, jumped a fence, and ran 
through a parking lot as they fled the crime scene (T. 14). 
After this escape, Palmer had presence of mind to immediately 
call the police despite a threat made by the gunman to prevent 
Palmer from doing so (T.14). 
The sole issue at trial, which occurred over one 
year after the robbery, was identification. Despite his 
identification of the perpetrator from the police photograph, 
Palmer was unable to make an in-court identification of the 
appellant as the perpetrator of this crime. 
A Salt Lake City po~ice officer, John Cook, 
testified that the photograph Palmer identified prior to the 
trial was a picture of the appellant, Robert Reedy (T. 38). 
The officer also testified that approximately one year before 
the trial Reedy had looked very similar to the photograph that 
had been taken (T. 39). Cook described a number of changes 
-3-
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that had occurred in the appellant's appearance between his 
arrest a:~d trial. These changes in appearance included a 
weight loss and a difference in hair style (T. 40). One of the 
reasons Palmer could not identify the appellant in court as 
the man who robbed him was because of a hair style difference 
(T. 17). 
The appellant requested at trial that the jury be 
given what has become known as a "Telfaire"2 instruction on 
the danger of inaccurate identification of perpetrators by 
eyewitnesses. The trial judge refused to give this 
instruction, but instead gave one instruction which cautioned 
the jury that the appellant was entitled to a presumption of 
innocence and not to convict ~f they held reasonable doubt as 
to his guilt (J~I. #4, R. 33). Also, another instruction 
which told jury members that ·they were the exclusive judges of 
witness credibility and .the weight to give evidence was given. 
This instruction cautioned jury members to consider the 
capacity of a witness to remember in assessing his testimony 
(J.I. #6, R. 35). . +· Also, during trial, the appellant's counsel 
rigorously cross-examined Mr. Palmer, the key eyewitness, and 
pressed the issue of a possibly inaccurate identification 
during his final argument to the jury (T. 18-32, T. 63-75). 
Nevertheless, the appellant was convicted by the jury of 
• aggravated robbery. 
2 See U.S. v. Telfaire, D.C. Circuit, 469 F.2d 552 (1972). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION 
CONCERNING THE DANGERS AND INACCURACIES 
OF EYEWITNESS WAS PROPER. 
A. THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT REQUIRED 
UNDER THE LAW.3 
In the case of State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 
56 (1982), this Court held that it was not error for a trial 
court to fail to give a similar instruction on the potential 
inaccuracy of eyewitness identification testimony. In 
3 Proposed Jury Instruction 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. In this case its value depends 
on the opportunity the witness had to observe whether or 
not the defendant was the person who committed the 
aggravated robbery of John Glen Palmer on June 28, 1980, 
and to make a reliable identification later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a 
witness, you should consider the following: 
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the 
capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the 
off ender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to 
observe the person at the time will be affected by such 
matters as how long or short a time was available, how far 
or close the witness was from the offender, how good were 
lighting conditions, whether the witness had had occasion 
to see or know the person in the past. 
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by 
that witness subsequent to the event was a product of his 
or her own recollection? You may take into account both 
• the strength of the identification, and the circumstances 
under which the identification was made. 
If the identification by the witness may have been 
influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant 
was presented to him.for identification, you should 
scrutinize the identification with great care. You may 
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Malmrose, the defendant was convicted of forcible sexual 
abuse. The victim was attacked while she was jogging at Weber 
State College. Unlike the instant case, where an 
identification occurred within twelve days of the offense, the 
victim in Malmrose was unable to make any identification of 
the defendant until approximately three months had passed 
since the crime. Finally, she picked the defendant out of a 
photograph from a school yearbook. 
Malmrose appealed his conviction on the basis that 
the trial court had improperly failed to give an instruction 
on the weight and credibility the jury should give to 
eyewitness testimony. This Court considered the proposition 
and held otherwise. In the majority opinion, Justice Howe 
stated: 
• 
also consider the length of time that lapsed between the 
occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the 
witness to see defendant, as a factor bearing on the 
realiability of the identification. 
(3) Finally, you must consider the credibility of 
each identification witness in the same way as any other 
witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider 
whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make a 
reliable observation on the matter covered in his testi-
mony. 
The burden of proof on the State extends to every 
element of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator 
is such an element. The State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Robert Reedy, Jr., was the 
perpetrator of the offense in question in this case. If 
after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt 
as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the 
defendant not guilty (R. 66-67). 
-6-
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We have not heretofore held that such 
an instruction is required. We believe 
the giving of it should be left to the 
discretion of the trial court. 
Such a position is sound; the trial judge is most 
able to assess the appropriateness of an instruction on a case 
by case basis. Justice Stewart's dissent in Malmrose 
indicated that such an instruction should have been given to 
the jury because (1) there were discrepancies in the victim's 
description of the defendant and his actual appearance; (2) 
there was a lengthy period of time between the assault and 
identification; (3) the photographic identification may have 
been suggestive because at first only two pictures were shown 
the victim; and (4) there was substantial corraboration of the 
defendant's alibi. A close analysis of the case at bar 
reveals that none of these factors is present. First, there 
was little or no discrepancy between the description of the 
defendant and his actual appearance when arrested. He had 
long, dark hair and was heavy-set. Second, his identification 
from a photograph occurred only twelve days after the crime. 
Third, six photographs instead of two were shown to the 
identifying eyewitness, Mr. Palmer. Appellant does not claim 
that this procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. Finally, 
appellant offered only a weak defense in the form of testimony 
concerning an alleged beard. In Malmrose, substantial 
• 
cooraboration of an alibi occurred from a number of witnesses. 
A similar result has occurred in other cases. State 
v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 353 (1980). State v. Schaffer, 
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Utah, 638 P.2d 1185 (1981). In State v. Mccumber, a man was 
convicted of sexual assault, burglary, and rape. Eyewitness 
identification was crucial because the victim had been 
attacked in the dark in her own bedroom. Defense counsel 
submitted a proposed jury instruction to the trial judge which 
was much like the instruction in this case, in that it dealt 
at length with the potential inaccuracy and credibility 
problems associated with eyewitness identification. The trial 
court refused the instruction and an appeal was made on this 
point to this Court. This Court then held, the trial court 
committed no error by failing to give the instruction: 
The principle points of defendant's 
proposed instruction dealt with the 
state's burden of proof and the factors to 
consider in weighing the testimony of an 
eyewitness. All of these factors to 
consider in weighing the testimo-y of an 
eyewitness. All of these factors were 
adequately dealt with in other instruc-
tions presented to the jury by the trial 
court. As a result, we cannot agree that 
the denial of the proposed instruction 
constituted reversible error. 
622 P.2d at 359. 
In State v. Schaffer, two men robbed a Salt Lake 
piz~a parlor at approximately 10:30 p.m. on a summer night. 
The defendant in that case was convicted almost entirely on 
the basis of the testimony of two eyewitnesses. The 
circumstances of this identification in Schaffer were less 
• 
ideal than in our case because the perpetrator in Schaffer was 
inside a pizza parlor at night as opposed to being outside a 
gas station in daylight at approximately 8:30 in the morning. 
-8-
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Nevertheless, this Court affirmed the conviction in Schaffer 
and held that error had not been committed. This Court said: 
Defendant cites authorities stating 
that the giving of a specific jury 
instruction is desirable when identif ica-
tion is in issue. In view of the general 
instructions summarized above and in view 
of the witnesses' abundant opportunity to 
observe the robber when he was drinking 
beer, and when he was in the well lit 
kitchen area to order pizza, to empty the 
cash register, and to shut the witnesses 
in the cooler, the omission of the 
desirable identification instruction did 
not constitute reversible error. 
638 P.2d at 1187. 
Finally, the identification in the instant case was 
credible because the key eyewitness selected the appellant 
from six separate photographs of different individuals and 
because the witness observed appellant once when he gave 
appellant change, and later when he was robbed. Moreover, Mr. 
Palmer's recollection of a face-to-face daylight encounter 
evidences sharp perception and presence of mind retained 
throughout a harrowing experience. Respondent submits that 
any normal person would have exhibited some signs of severe 
tension and anxiety at the conclusion of Mr. Palmer's 
experience; as evidenced by his testimony, Mr. Palmer, 
commendably, was in control when it counted -- during the 
robbery. Cases from other jurisdictions are in accord with 
these precedents. In State v. Taylor, Arizona, 109, 267, 508 
• 
p.2d 731 (1973), the trial court refused to give a similar 
instruction on eyewitness identification to a Jury in 
-9-
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a murder trial. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed a murder 
conviction in this case. The Court stated that: 
The requested instruction on identi-
fication would not have added anything to 
these general instructions given to the 
jury. The trial court's references to the 
presumption of innocence, the necessity of 
proving all material allegations and the 
credit to be given the eyewitnesses would 
certainly have meaning for the jury as 
applied to the testimony of the identity 
witnesses. The weight to be given such 
testimony of such witnesses is a matter 
for the determination of the jury or court 
trying the case. 
We find no error in the failure of 
the trial court to give the requested 
instructions on identity. 
508 P.2d at 738. 
In State v. Ollison, Oregon, 519 P.2d 393 (1974), a 
robbery conviction was sustained by the Oregon Supreme Court. 
The conviction was largely obtained on the basis of eyewitness 
identification. Despite the refusal of the trial court to 
give a "Telfaire type" instruction to the jury on the problems 
of eyewitness identification, the conviction was affirmed. The 
Court stated: 
• 
While an instruction concerning 
identification would not have been 
unappropriate in this case, our review of 
the record indicates that the identity 
issue was significantly brought into focus 
and drawn to the attention of the jury --
both by questions directed to the wit-
nesses and by the court's instructions • 
Therefore, the failure to give an instruc-
tion on identification was not prejudical 
error. 
519 P.2d at 396. 
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Many other cases have been decided with similar 
facts and have also held that no error resulted from a failure 
to instruct the jury at great detail as to the potential 
inaccuracy and credibility problems of eyewitness 
testirnony.4 
. 
B. THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION FAILED 
TO FIT THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
A review of the appellant's proposed jury 
instruction indicates that a number of its passages and 
sections are inappropriate here because they do not support 
the evidence adduced at trial. A defendant is not entitled to 
a jury instruction if it does not fit any reasonable version 
of the facts in the case. State v. Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261 
(1980); State v. Castillo, Utah, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 
(1969). It should be kept in mind that the only issue in this 
case was whether the identification of the appellant as one of 
the perpetrators of the crime was accurate or not. 
Subsection two of appellant's proposed instruction 
was inappropriate because it asks the jury to scrutinize 
4 State v. Davis, 649 S.W.2d 12 (1982) [Tennessee]. State 
v. Gravely, 299 S.E.2d 375 (1982) [West Virginia]. State 
v. Arnmburg, 31 Wash. App. 696, 644 P.2d 717 (1982) 
· [Washington]. People v. Martinez, Colo. app. 652 P.2d 174 
(1981) [Colorado]. Sparks v. State, 604 P.2d 802 (1980) 
(Nevada]. Hawaii v. Padilla, 552 P.2d 357 (1976) [Hawaii]. 
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whether the identification made by the witness was a product 
of his or her own recollection. This was not a problem 
because the witness, Mr. Palmer, chose the appellant's 
photograph out of a total of six different photographs. It 
was not argued that such an identification was unduly 
suggestive or not a product of the appellant's own 
recollection. Also, subsection two speaks of an 
identification of the defendant after he has been "presented 
to the eyewitness for identification." This is completely 
inappropriate because the identification of the defendant that 
occurred here was a photo-identification and not a line-up or 
show-up identification as this instruction suggests. The 
concluding paragraph speaks to burden of proof and reasonable 
doubt -- areas covered by other instructions given to the 
jury. In sum, the instruction was not properly drafted to fit 
the facts of the case. 
C. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE 
ACTUALLY GIVEN, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, 
ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE JURY. 
Jury instructions are to be considered as a whole 
and are to be reconciled whenever possible. State v. 
Schaffer, supra. State v. Coffey, Utah, 564 P.2d 777 (1977). 
Taylor v. Johnson, Utah, 18 Utah 2d 16, 414 P.2d 575 (1966). 
k number of jury insturctions actually given to the jury in 
the instant case did deal with the issues of witness 
identification. 
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For example, Instruction No. 4 instructed the jury 
members that in order to convict they must find that the State 
had proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
(J.I. #4, R. 33). More significantly, instruction No. 6 told 
the jury that: 
You are the exclusive judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of their testimony. In so judging 
you can take into consideration any 
interest a witness may have in a lawsuit 
and any bias or probable motive, or lack 
thereof, to testify as they do, if any is 
shown. You may also consider the deport-
ment of witnesses upon the witness stand 
the reasonableness or lack thereof of 
their statements, their frankness or the 
want of it, their ability to understand, 
their capacity to remember and whether any 
witness contradicted himself or herself, 
and then determine therefrom, in accord-
ance with your honest convictions what 
weight and credibility you should give to 
the testimony of each witness, measured by 
reason and common sense and the rules set 
forth in these instructions." 
(J.I. #6, R. 35) (emphasis added). 
In view of the rule that jury instructions are to be 
considered together, the "presumption of innocence" language 
and the "reasonable doubt" language from the fourth 
instruction should be considered together with the "capacity 
to remember" and "weight of t~stimony" language of the sixth 
instruction. When this occurs, it becomes clear that the jury 
was properly instructed concerning any potential problems with 
eyewitness testimony accuracy. 
Additionally, these issues were also raised by 
appellant's counsel, both through his rigorous 
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cross-examination of the key eyewitness at the trial, and 
t~rough his final argument to the jury which stressed the 
issue of mistaken eyewitness identification at great length 
(T. 18-32; T. 63-75). 
D. APPELLANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION, 
MODELED AFTER THE TELFAIRE CASE JURY 
INSTRUCTION, IS TOO STRONG AND IS 
BIASED AGAINST THE STATE. 
Appellant's proposed instruction in this case is 
lengthy and complex. In fact, other courts have held that 
such an instruction, modeled after the instruction in the 
Telfaire case, is too lengthy and complicated to give to a 
jury. For example, in State v. Abernathy, 31 Wash. App. 635, 
644 P.2d 691 (1982), it was stated that: 
Id. at 693 
We conclude the court properly ref used 
the complex witness identification 
instruction based on U.S. v. Telfaire. 
This point was made again by the Washington Court of 
Appeals in State v. Jordan, 17 Wash. App. 542, 564 P.2d 340 
(1977): 
Id. at 341 
We believe that the instruction-is 
impermissibly slanted to the degree that 
it should not be given in Washington. 
Witness credibility is more properly 
tested by examination and cross-examina-
t ion in the forum of the trial court. 
Closing argument affords counsel the 
appropriate means to point any weaknesses 
in eyewitness identification. 
-14-
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CONCLUSION 
The appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery 
following a jury trial in the Third Judicial District. He 
fully exercised his right to cross-examine the eyewitness and 
the other key witnesses in the case. The cross-examination 
was rigorous and thorough. In his final argument to the jury, 
appellant's counsel focused on the dangers of eyewitness 
testimony. Finally, instructions were given to the jury which 
urged the members of that panel to consider the weight to be 
given to the various witnesses and their testimony. This 
instruction, while not so detailed as the appellant's proposed 
instruction, adequately raised the issue of inaccurate 
eyewitness identification, particularly when considered in 
connection with another jury instruction. 
The identification of the appellant by the State's 
key eyewitness was credible because of (1) his selection of 
the appellant from six photographs of different individuals; 
(2) his observation of appellant in broad daylight, first when 
he gave appellant change and later when he was robbed; (3) his 
detailed description of the crime and the location of the two 
perpetrators during its occurrence; and (4) his identification 
of the appellant's photo, which occurred less than two weeks 
after the crime • 
• 
This Court has not held that it is error to refuse a 
"Telfaire type" instruction of jury identification and it 
should not do so in this case. When the cross-examination, 
-15-
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final argument, and the actual jury instructions are 
c_onsidered together, respondent asserts that the the issue of 
mistaken identification was adequately and poperly presented 
to the jury. 
1983. 
The conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ day Of August, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
~ 
CURTIS J. DRAKE ~ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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